Charles Taylor's “radical redefinition of secularism” has a significant place in the post-9/11 research on secularism. He replaces secularism's “old” paradigm, separation between state and religious institutions, with a “new” one, responding to diversity. Taylor appeals to French laïcité in-itself as the old paradigm. With an analysis of the parliamentary debates at the institutional origins of the old paradigm in the Third French Republic, this article questions whether Taylor's redefinition of secularism is truly radical. This historical intervention in Taylor's “radical redefinition” reformulates his novelty as the reconfiguration of the relation between generality of laws and meaning worlds in the institutional response to diversity. The Third Republic pushed generality in laws against diverse meaning worlds. Taylor (with Jocelyn Maclure) demands that general laws reasonably accommodate “meaning-giving convictions.” I explore this reversal and argue that it's questionable Taylor offers a radical redefinition of secularism—or even that we need one.

The states of the Arabian Gulf present a novel case for the examination of relations between authoritarian governance and Christian organizations. The economic clout of the Gulf states has been central to political stability and legitimacy but they are increasingly seeking to expand and consolidate the soft power and resilience through political and diplomatic initiatives. This article examines how the Christian organizations established in recent decades by large migrant communities are incorporated into this strategy and how they are responding. It argues that religious tolerance has formed a central discourse in governmental policies and narratives that construct the Gulf states as modern progressive nations, despite their unique political systems based mainly on constitutional monarchies with limited political participation. This constructs local Christian communities as a source of soft power, despite their position as a religious minority.

A long line of research has established that Americans who subscribe to Christian nationalism have a preference for those inside their group and animosity toward those outside their group. These beliefs may impede the equal application of the rule of law, a link that has been suggested but not formally tested. Utilizing experimental data from a survey conducted in fall 2021, we assess the equal application of the rule of law for in and outgroup members conditional on Christian nationalism and belief in Christian persecution. We suggest that ingroup love may move distinctly from outgroup hate. Our results suggest that Christian nationalists have a preference for the ingroup, but do not automatically denigrate outgroups. However, belief in Christian persecution drives animosity toward outgroups, while not elevating the ingroup. Christian nationalist outgroup hatred must be triggered by threat, which has been the project of movement and party elites.

QAnon is beginning to gain attention in scholarly circles, but these sources often disagree about how to categorize the movement. This amounts to the meta-dispute between those who view QAnon primarily as a religious “cult,” and those who grant it greater credibility as a political populist movement. Using quantitative and qualitative methods we test the proposition that QAnon could be a mix of both. Results from both analyses suggest that QAnon is best understood primarily as a political populist movement, but one that utilizes religious rhetoric. The findings thus highlight the asymmetric nature of the conflation of religion and politics in the contemporary American civil sphere.

Atheists can expect discrimination when running for office. We know less about political appraisal of other types of nonreligious candidates or how the influence of nonreligion compares to other factors. Using a conjoint experiment, I examine how the impact of nonreligion on vote choice depends on (1) the label describing nonreligion; (2) the electoral scenario in which voters face the candidate; and (3) voters' partisanship and religiosity. I find that atheists and nonbelievers are at a substantial disadvantage but secular candidates suffer a smaller penalty. While nonreligion reduces political support, it is not the most important influence, plays a smaller role in lower than in higher level elections, and is generally not a factor for Democratic and nonreligious voters. In contrast, it is a major liability for Republican, Independent, and religious voters, especially when Republicans vote in nominating contests and when they face atheists or nonbelievers as opposed to secular candidates.

What is the nature of church–state relations in countries where politics is restrictive, religious autonomy is limited, and Christians tend to be viewed as existential threats by those in power? This article examines the highly securitized environment for Catholics and Protestants in China and the evolving government strategies used to regulate religious life. We argue that these efforts—ranging from channeling Christians into state-sponsored institutions, promoting patriotism in seminaries, and compelling churches to Sinicize—not only extends the reach of the party-state into Christian communities, but also puts the Party at the center of religious life. There are several implications from this analysis. One is that it documents how authoritarian regimes attempt to “domesticate” religion using multi-dimensional and long-term strategies of control. A second demonstrates how strong states, like China, seek to cultivate patriotic clergy and orient them favorably toward the regime. A third shows how Christians navigate restrictive environments.

This paper analyzes relationships between Islamic religious behaviors and civic engagement in Europe and North America. Using data from an original survey of Muslims in Canada, France, Germany, the UK, and the United States, it finds that Muslim religious behaviors relate to civic behaviors in varied ways. The conventional distinction between public and private religious behaviors does not graft perfectly on to Islamic religious behaviors, but the way Islamic religious behaviors straddle the public-private divide help explain their relationships with civic behaviors. Mosque attendance, an example of public religious behavior, is positively associated with secular organizational membership and mainstream political behaviors, and negatively associated with protest activity. Private, or quasi-private, religious behaviors are more commonly associated with protest activities. There are some national-level differences in patterns of civic engagement after controlling for other determinants, but not many, suggesting similar mechanisms mobilize and facilitate Muslim civic incorporation across national contexts. The results suggest that Islamic religious behaviors create diverse opportunities for Muslims to engage as civic citizens.