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Choices, Values, and Frames
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  • 79 b/w illus. 66 tables
  • Page extent: 860 pages
  • Size: 234 x 156 mm
  • Weight: 1.07 kg

Library of Congress

  • Dewey number: 658.4/03
  • Dewey version: 21
  • LC Classification: HD30.23 .C469 2000
  • LC Subject headings:
    • Decision-making
    • Uncertainty
    • Risk-taking (Psychology)
    • Value

Library of Congress Record

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 (ISBN-13: 9780521627498 | ISBN-10: 0521627494)

  • There was also a Hardback of this title but it is no longer available | Adobe eBook
  • Published September 2000

Manufactured on demand: supplied direct from the printer

$87.99 (X)

Choices, Values, and Frames presents an empirical and theoretical challenge to classical utility theory, offering prospect theory as an alternative framework. Extensions and applications to diverse economic phenomena and to studies of consumer behavior are discussed. The book also elaborates on framing effects and other demonstrations that preferences are constructed in context, and it develops new approaches to the standard view of choice-based utility. As with the classic 1982 volume, Judgment Under Uncertainty, this volume is comprised of papers published in diverse academic journals. The editors have written several new chapters and a preface to provide a context for the work.


1. Choices, values, and frames; Part I. Prospect Theory and Extensions: 2. Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk; 3. Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty; Part II. The Certainty Effect and the Weighting Function: 4. Compound invariant weighting function in prospect theory; 5. Weighing risk and uncertainty; 6. A belief-based account of decision under uncertainty; Part III. Loss Aversion and the Value Function: 7. Loss aversion in riskless choice: a reference-dependent model; 8. Anomalies: the endowment effect, loss aversion, and status quo bias; 9. The endowment effect and evidence of nonreversible indifference curves; 10. A test of the theory of reference-dependent preferences; Part IV. Framing and Mental Accounting: 11. Rational choice and the framing of decisions; 12. Framing, probability distortions, and insurance decisions; 13. Mental accounting matters; Part V. Applications: 14. Toward a positive theory of consumer choice; 15. Prospect theory in the wild: evidence from the field; 16. Myopic loss aversion and the equity premium puzzle; 17. Fairness as a constraint on profit seeking: entitlements in the market; 18. Money illusion; 19. Labor supply of New York City cab drivers: one day at a time; 20. Are investors reluctant to realize their losses?; 21. Timid choices and bold forecasts: a cognitive perspective on risk taking; 22. Overconfidence and excess entry: an experimental approach; 23. Judicial choice and disparities between measures of economic values; 24. Contrasting rational and psychological analyses of political choice; 25. Conflict resolution: a cognitive perspective; Part VI. The Multiplicity of Value: Reversals of Preference: 26. The construction of preference; 27. Contingent weighting in judgment and choice; 28. Context-dependent preferences; 29. Ambiguity aversion and comparative ignorance; 30. The evaluability hypothesis: explaining joint-separate preference reversals and beyond; Part VII. Choice over Time: 31. Preferences for sequences of outcomes; 32. Anomalies in intertemporal choice: evidence and an interpretation; Part VIII. Alternative Conceptions of Value: 33. Reason-based choice; 34. Value elicitation: is there anything in there?; 35. Economists have preferences, psychologists have attitudes: an analysis of dollar responses to public issues; Part IX. Experienced Utility: 36. Endowments and contrast in judgments of well-being; 37. A bias in the prediction of tastes; 38. The effect of purchase quantity and timing on variety-seeking behavior; 39. Back to Bentham? Explorations of expereiences utility; 40. New challenges to the rationality assumption.

Prize Winner

2003 Grawemeyer Award for Powerful Ideas in Psychology


"Daniel Kahneman and the late Amos Tversky have started a new perspective on the traditional economic categories of choice, decision, and value. A series of experimental and empirical studies by them and others have rejected traditional economic assumptions of rationality. Even more importantly, these scholars have developed alternative generalizations with significant predictive power and have found empirical verification for them. This outstanding collection of studies will make these new results widely accessible." Kenneth J. Arrow, Joan Kenney Professor of Economics, Emeritus and Professor of Operations Research, Emeritus, Stanford University


Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, Drazen Prelec, Craig R. Fox, Jack L. Knetsch, Richard H. Thaler, Ian Bateman, Alistair Munro, Bruce Rhodes, Chris Starmer, Robert Sugden, Eric J. Johnson, John Hershey, Jacqueline Meszaros, Howard Kunreuther, Colin Camerer, Shlomo Benzarti, Eldar Shafir, Peter Diamond, Linda Babcock, George L. Loewenstein, Terrance Odean, Daniel Lovallo, David Cohen, George A. Quattrone, Paul Slovic, Shmuel Sattath, Itamar Simonson, Christopher K. Hsee, George F. Loewenstein, Baruch Fischoff, Ilana Ritov, David Schkade, Dale Griffin, Daniel Adler, Peter P. Wakker, Rakesh Sarin

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