Skip to content
Register Sign in Wishlist

Common Pool Resources
Strategic Behavior, Inefficiencies, and Incomplete Information

$24.00 ( ) USD

  • Date Published: October 2021
  • availability: This ISBN is for an eBook version which is distributed on our behalf by a third party.
  • format: Adobe eBook Reader
  • isbn: 9781108913003

$ 24.00 USD ( )
Adobe eBook Reader

You will be taken to ebooks.com for this purchase
Buy eBook Add to wishlist

Other available formats:
Hardback, Paperback


Looking for an examination copy?

If you are interested in the title for your course we can consider offering an examination copy. To register your interest please contact collegesales@cambridge.org providing details of the course you are teaching.

Description
Product filter button
Description
Contents
Resources
Courses
About the Authors
  • Common Pool Resources include, for instance, fishing grounds, irrigation systems, forests and the atmosphere. Now more than ever, how we responsibly share and use those goods is a vital issue. This textbook introduces students of economics, business and policy studies to the key issues in the field. It uses a game-theory approach to help readers understand the mathematical representation of how to find equilibrium behavior in CPRs, how to identify the socially optimal appropriation, and how to measure the inefficiencies that arise. Algebra and calculus steps are clearly explained, so students can more easily reproduce the analysis and apply it in their own research. Finally, the book also summarizes experimental studies that tested theoretical results in controlled environments, introducing readers to a literature that has expanded over the last decades, and provides references for further reading.

    • Shows both theoretical predictions and results of experiments
    • Designed for undergraduate students in environmental economics, business or policy studies
    • Step-by-step approach suitable for courses only requiring a basic level of algebra and calculus
    Read more

    Reviews & endorsements

    ‘If you are looking for a textbook on common-pool resource problems that is both rigorous and intuitive, then you can’t go wrong with this book. In a clear and engaging writing style, it provides comprehensive coverage of the individual and combined roles of strategic interactions, information and dynamics on the outcomes for all the involved parties. Professors and students will appreciate the analysis and exercises.’ George Zaccour, HEC Montreal, Canada

    ‘Common-pool-resources experience the tragedy of the commons. The wonderful framework presented in this book addresses strategic behavior, inefficiencies, and incomplete information, all of which challenge optimal CPR management. This introductory-level textbook features simple and simplified game theory models and an emphasis on the institutions behind the various modeling assumptions. Presented in a clear manner, this textbook is accessible to both senior undergraduates as well as to graduate students and scholars.’ Ariel Dinar, University of California, Riverside

    ‘This book provides an excellent explanation of common pool resources use by building a simple model and expanding on that model to incorporate many of the complexities associated with natural resources including repeated interactions, incomplete information, and uncertainty. The material presented introduces more complex economic modeling but at a level that is still useful for advanced undergraduates.’ Adrienne Ohler, University of Missouri

    ‘This textbook offers a great introduction to Common Pool Resources. It is a helpful tool that provides not only a step by step guide on how to solve CPR problems but also the economic interpretation of the results to help understand the intuition behind the outcomes.’ Eleni Stathopoulou, Nottingham Trent University

    See more reviews

    Customer reviews

    Not yet reviewed

    Be the first to review

    Review was not posted due to profanity

    ×

    , create a review

    (If you're not , sign out)

    Please enter the right captcha value
    Please enter a star rating.
    Your review must be a minimum of 12 words.

    How do you rate this item?

    ×

    Product details

    • Date Published: October 2021
    • format: Adobe eBook Reader
    • isbn: 9781108913003
    • availability: This ISBN is for an eBook version which is distributed on our behalf by a third party.
  • Table of Contents

    Preface
    1. Introduction
    2. Common pool resources in a static setting
    3. Common pool resources in a dynamic setting
    4. Entry deterrence in the commons
    5. Repeated interaction in the commons
    6. Commons under incomplete information
    7. Signaling in the commons
    Appendix A: game theory tools
    Appendix B: solutions of selected end-of-chapter exercises.

  • Authors

    Ana Espinola-Arredondo, Washington State University
    Ana Espinola-Arredondo is a Professor in the School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.

    Felix Muñoz-Garcia, Washington State University
    Felix Muñoz-Garcia is a Professor in the School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.

Sorry, this resource is locked

Please register or sign in to request access. If you are having problems accessing these resources please email lecturers@cambridge.org

Register Sign in
Please note that this file is password protected. You will be asked to input your password on the next screen.

» Proceed

You are now leaving the Cambridge University Press website. Your eBook purchase and download will be completed by our partner www.ebooks.com. Please see the permission section of the www.ebooks.com catalogue page for details of the print & copy limits on our eBooks.

Continue ×

Continue ×

Continue ×
warning icon

Turn stock notifications on?

You must be signed in to your Cambridge account to turn product stock notifications on or off.

Sign in Create a Cambridge account arrow icon
×

Find content that relates to you

Join us online

This site uses cookies to improve your experience. Read more Close

Are you sure you want to delete your account?

This cannot be undone.

Cancel

Thank you for your feedback which will help us improve our service.

If you requested a response, we will make sure to get back to you shortly.

×
Please fill in the required fields in your feedback submission.
×