Bernard Shaw (1856–1950) is usually thought of as a playwright: author of such works as St. Joan and Major Barbara; winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1925. What is often overlooked is that he first achieved prominence in public life as a leading member of the Fabian Society, advocating a piecemeal, reformist, evolutionary brand of socialism which he considered more appropriate to the British political tradition than revolutionary Marxism. The Fabian Society—largely through the work of Sidney and Beatrice Webb—is often credited with having played a crucial part in the formation of the welfare state, and more generally it is looked upon as the major source of new ideas and policies in the British Labour Movement. Shaw served on the Society's executive committee for over two decades, acting as resident propagandist and original thinker, often tackling neglected themes. It was in this way that he developed an interest in international relations. He eventually resigned from the executive in 1911, seeking inter alia greater freedom to express his views on world events. His thoughts on the Great War, therefore, cannot be read as statements of Fabian doctrine in any strict sense. Nevertheless, his association with the Society remained close enough for those thoughts to be seen as belonging to the broadly Fabian school of social democracy. This, in essence, was the intellectual context within which he operated.

During 1982 the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was conspicuous largely for a lack of any effective role. Paradoxically, however, Fiji had earned a measure of distinction for its contribution to international peace through UNIFIL, and was in consequence asked to participate in the Sinai peacekeeping force in 1982. At the same time, Fiji's first experience in international peacekeeping also exposed it to many of the constraints and frustrations of such ventures. As has been shown elsewhere, UNIFIL's experiences are in keeping with the history of UN peacekeeping. The argument in this paper is that the experiences of the Fijian component of UNIFIL are equally at one with the experiences of national contingents generally in UN forces; that in certain areas the Fijian involvement displays unique features that are partly a function of its ministate characteristics; and that Fiji's contributions to peacekeeping is an effective answer to old doubts about UN membership for ministates.

In the early hours of 18 September 1939, before crossing the Roumanian frontier, the Polish foreign minister sent the following instructions to Poland's ambassadors in London and Paris.

The military situation in Poland in the current conflict is such as to necessitate the transfer abroad of the seat of the President of the Republic and of the Government. The Polish Government has the honour to inform the Government of His Britannic majesty that it is today contacting the Government of the French Republic concerning the extraterritorial exercise of its powers on French soil.

While economic growth is not a sufficient condition for the elimination of hunger and abject poverty, it certainly looks like a necessary condition, particularly in the poorest countries (Ahluwalia, Carter and Chenery? 1979), So economic growth is desirable, and desired, in the third world (irrespective of one's evaluation of the effects of growth in industrialized, high income countries). As well as pressures for growth? there are internal and external pressures for the democratization of the political systems of less developed countries. Yet some authors claim that democracy and economic growth are incompatible. A strong version of the incompatibility thesis is maintained by the sociologist Andreski (1969: 266): ‘Democracy is compatible with rapid economic growth only in countries which already have enough resources to make heavy investment a relatively painless process. There is no case of a democratic government breaking through a vicious circle of misery and parasitism.’ Though qualifying the incompatibility proposition and restricting it to ‘later phases of development’, Huntington and Nelson (1976: 42–3) similarly argue that ‘… higher levels of political participation tend to produce lower rates of economic growth’. While political participation is not identical to democracy, the latter obviously permits the former. If democracy and growth were indeed incompatible in LDCs (or some subgroup thereof), then a major problem of choice has to be faced.

What is the student of politics to make of the revival of protectionism and the new mood of economic nationalism of which it is widely held to be a symptom? It is reasonably clear why nationalism raises problems for economists: for orthodox Marxists it entrenches false consciousness and delays the final crisis of capitalism; for liberals it frustrates the optimal allocation of resources by substituting group sentiment for the rational pursuit of individual self-interest and by endowing political frontiers with an economic significance to which their economic theory is opposed. But it is not self-evident that the assumptions on which the great neo-classical systems are built are the most helpful for understanding the phenomenon of economic nationalism or for evaluating the nature of the problem which it poses for international society. Since Marx himself was profoundly uninterested in the great debate between free trade and protection, while contemporary Marxist-Leninist governments all pursue economic policies which are unambiguously nationalist, I shall confine myself to the debate within the liberal tradition.