THERE are several reasons why we understand so much less about social processes and conditions at the global level than we do about comparable processes and conditions at lower levels of aggregation. One is, of course, that we are dealing with a larger empirical domain and one that is apparently more heterogeneous and complex. Another might be that the behaviour of nations – the key actors at this level of aggregation – has been shrouded more in mystery and taboo than the behaviour of other classes of social entity. By keeping diplomacy and military strategy in the category of the arcane, elites have inhibited serious inquiry, even if there were those unpatriotic enough to ask. A third and related factor may be the extent to which the national state has been the major source of material and psychic sustenance for the world's people over the past century or so and thus not an agency whose external behaviour will be questioned or examined closely. Others might be added to our list, but one that surely merits closer attention may be the way in which we conceptualize world affairs.

The demands of the less developed countries (LDCs) for a fundamental reform of the economic, commercial and financial relationships between themselves and the rich, developed economies have dominated international affairs for the past three years. In April–May 1974, the sixth Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations called for the establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and similar appeals have been made on a large number of occasions since then. 1976 was marked by UNGTAD IV meeting in Nairobi, Kenya in May and the commencement of the deliberations of the Conference on International Economic Co-operation (the so-called North-South Conference) meeting in Paris, originally scheduled to end in December 1976, but reconvened for a final session at the end of May 1977

Although our theorizing about the making of foreign policy is meant to be of general application, it is based predominantly upon Western, often only United States practices. The purpose of this paper is to look in some depth into a case study of foreign policy-making in Japan in order to ascertain to what extent the analytical categories evolved in the West apply and what peculiarities of the Japanese political system need to be considered. More specifically, I shall test the simple hypothesis that in all ‘democratic’ systems1 the substance of the domestic processes shows great similarities while their forms greatly differ.

In recent years, the use of systems terminology has become widespread in international relations literature. This development has precipitated both confusion and controversy – confusion about what exactly is meant by a systems approach and controversy about whether the approach provides any new insights for the international relations specialist. The confusion and controversy spreads across the methodological divide which exists in the discipline; both traditionalists and behaviouralists are in disagreement about the nature of a systems approach and its potential utility.

The title of the article is intended to focus the attention of Western writers on international relations theory upon two aspects of this rapidly growing research area. Rather than meeting with an incomprehensible neglect it is our argument that the aspects referred to might well be accorded one of the key places. Failure to do so, it our contention, when transferred from considerations of theoretical efficiency into the no less precarious realm of practical policy, might well have proportionately hazardous implications. We would beg forbearance, however, if within the necessarily limited scope of this article only a very perfunctory and sketchy outline of the meaning and implications of the omissions can be given. The sole purpose of this article is to provoke interest in these particular areas rather than to supply the deficiencies – a task which clearly could only be undertaken in the expanded context of a major work.

The work presented in this paper arises from a study of foreign policy formation in the British Labour Party and its behaviour towards the issue of British membership of the European Economic Community.1

At the time of his death in February 1976, Alastair Buchan was preparing what he intended as his major work – a three volume history of American foreign policy since 1945. He had completed only two draft chapters, both of which focused on the impact of the war and its immediate aftermath on American perceptions of her future role in international politics. Because the draft chapters were so few in number it was not considered possible to have the study continued along the lines envisaged by the author. In order that some indication of the tentative judgement of so eminent a student of United States diplomacy be available, the article below has been extracted from what would have been the second chapter of the first volume.

This article does not purport to be a critique of a stimulating review of four recent textbooks on British foreign policy. A review article, however, does present an opportunity to speculate beyond the confines of the immediate text(s) to make some assessment of the ‘state of the discipline’. The writer believes that such an assessment is long overdue and that an important opportunity in this journal was inadequately grasped. What follows, then, are some initial comments on the status of British foreign policy studies in the context of contemporary foreign policy analysis.