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Deontological sceptical theism proved

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 April 2023

Perry Hendricks Open the ORCID record for Perry Hendricks [Opens in a new window]
Perry Hendricks*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA
*
Email: hendri59@purdue.edu
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Abstract

In this article, I argue that sceptical theists have too narrow a focus: they consider only God's axiological reasons, ignoring any non-axiological reasons he may have. But this is a mistake: predicting how God will act requires knowing about his reasons in general, and this requires knowing about both God's axiological and non-axiological reasons. In light of this, I construct and defend a kind of sceptical theism – Deontological Sceptical Theism – that encompasses all of God's reasons, and briefly illustrate how it renders irrelevant certain charges of excessive sceptical and how it evaporates equiprobability objections. Furthermore, I put forth a simple argument in favour of Deontological Sceptical Theism, which shows that everyone (at least currently) ought to endorse it.

Keywords

sceptical theismproblem of evilevidential problem of evildivine hiddennessatheism
Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 60 , Issue 2 , June 2024 , pp. 244 - 257
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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