Civil forfeiture is playing an increasingly prominent role in the fight against organised crime. While this tool is attractive to law enforcement agencies, it does give rise to concerns under Art 6 of the ECHR. Such proceedings ought to attract the full range of enhanced procedural protections inherent in the criminal process. Even if the Strasbourg Court decides otherwise, there is an argument that the presumption of innocence ought to apply where civil forfeiture proceedings are instituted against a person subsequent to that person being acquitted in criminal proceedings. The Strasbourg jurisprudence, though, is permeated by confusion and inconsistency, which does not inspire confidence that the rights of the individual will be protected. The final section of this paper, then, considers whether civil forfeiture represents a proportionate response in the fight against organised crime. Ultimately, though, given lack of information on such crime, we cannot provide an answer either way – what can be said, though, is that civil forfeiture has had a significant impact on the rights of the individual.

This paper challenges the prevailing assumption that the directors' duty to act for proper purposes under s 171 (b) of the Companies Act 2006 is well-grounded on authorities such as Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd, Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd, Lee Panavision Ltd v Lee Lighting Ltd and Extrasure Travel Insurances Ltd v Scattergood. It advances the argument that a close analysis of these authorities shows that, despite the use of the language of proper purpose, the primary and central justification for impugning the director's exercise of powers in question is that an implied term of the company's constitution was contravened. Given that case-law support for the proper purpose duty is at best overstated and at worst misconceived, a consideration of whether future cases concerning whether directors have breached their duties should be decided on the basis of whether an implied term of the constitution has been contravened under s 171(a), instead of whether directors have exercised their powers for proper purposes under s 171(b), is warranted. It is submitted that deciding cases based on implied terms under s 171(a) is more defensible because: (i) high authorities such as Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom and Equitable Life Assurance Society v Hyman endorse the use of implied terms as a technique for controlling the exercise of discretionary powers conferred on directors; (ii) a principled approach for implying terms can be derived from these authorities; (iii) there are safeguards that are built into the doctrine of implied terms; (iv) the application of the improper purpose doctrine gives rise to perennial problems; and (v) that doctrine is based on a fallacious conceptual justification.

This paper, through doctrinal analysis of the relevant case-law, examines the extent to which the prevention of fraud justifies equity's imposition of trusts that arise out of parol agreements. The authorities reveal that although there are a variety of circumstances in which equity will operate in such a manner, the nature of the fraud that prompts equity's intervention is always the same. Furthermore, it is argued that, since very early times, these trusts have been regarded as what are now best described as constructive trusts, and that all such trusts are enforced pursuant to a coherent doctrine of equity.

Protocol 16 ECHR will provide for an extension of the advisory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), enabling highest national courts to request advisory opinions on questions of principle concerning the interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) or its protocols. This extension of the ECtHR's advisory jurisdiction aims to achieve two goals: a reduction in the ECtHR's excessive docket, and the enhancement of dialogue between the ECtHR and (highest) national courts. While the aims of this reform initiative are laudable, we argue that Protocol 16 is likely to fail to achieve its objectives. Our analysis suggests that rather than facilitating the Court's adjudicatory function, extended advisory jurisdiction has the potential to impact on the Court's constitutionalist function in a manner that can be better achieved through the Court's contentious cases. The burden that this procedure will place on the Court's already overstretched resources would risk delays to contentious cases and potentially undermine judicial comity should requests for advisory opinions be declined. Furthermore, evidence of ‘constructive’ dialogue between highest national courts and the ECtHR is emerging in contentious cases without the need for a reformed advisory opinions mechanism. Rather than achieving its objectives, Protocol 16 risks exacerbating the Court's backlog and nullifying the positive effects of advisory opinions on dialogue.

In the pantheon of approaches open to participants in the pacific settlement of disputes, good offices holds a noteworthy place. The evolution of good offices over the past century is concurrent with a trend of considerable transformation within international law, including – amongst other changes – a move away from a state-led legal order, including in good offices following the emergence of the heads of international organisations as its prime users, and a process of legalisation and specialisation within the subject that has entirely altered its character. These changes have led to a redefinition of good offices that stresses the actor carrying out the role above the form that it takes. To accompany these changes in practice, there is a need for a transformation in the legal analysis and definition of good offices. One potential option in achieving this end is Bell's lex pacificatoria. If good offices is to continue to play a significant role in the settlement of violent conflicts, a fully developed legal analysis is necessary to grasp both its historical development and its potential future role.

The Mental Capacity Act 2005 introduced a statutory framework for advance decisions, thus promoting autonomous healthcare decision making in advance of loss of capacity. In order to be valid and applicable, and so binding on healthcare professionals, advance decisions refusing treatment (ADRT) must specify treatments to be refused and the circumstances of refusal. Recent case-law indicates that a high level of specificity is required for advance refusals of life-sustaining treatment and, in contrast to a presumption of capacity for contemporaneous decisions, in some circumstances capacity must be demonstrated at the time of making the advance decision. In comparison with the ‘stringent’ requirements for ADRT, the more generic Advance Care Planning (ACP) is gaining more prominence in end of life decision making. The paper explores recent case-law and its impact on the effectiveness of ADRT in practice and compares with ACP.