Cross-national case studies have indicated that compared to other economically advanced democracies, American methods of policy implementation and dispute resolution are more adversarial and legalistic, shaped by costly court action or the prospect of it. To what extent are lawyers responsible for creating American-style adversarial legalism? This article argues that while adversarial legalism stems primarily from enduring features of American political culture and governmental structure, the legal profession plays a significant independent role in promoting and perpetuating this mode of governance.

The republication after 40 years of T. H. Marshall's Citizenship and Social Class signifies a revived interest in sociolegal historical approaches to citizenship rights. For decades students have been guided by Marshall's classic treatise. But can Marshall's argument for the causal power of the “transition from feudalism to capitalism” continue to provide an adequate grounding for sociolegal approaches to citizenship and rights formation? Building on Marshall's path-breaking expansion of the concept of citizenship, I use institutional analysis and causal narrativity to present an alternative explanation. I argue that modem citizenship rights me a contingent outcome of the convergence of England's medieval legal revolutions with its regionally varied local legal and political cultures, not of the emergence of capitalist markets.

In this article, the author, a former prosecutor and a former assistant public defender, draws on his five and a half years of experience as a “professional plea bargainer” to explore the many subtleties of a practice that he suggests leads to work avoidance, misplaced loyalties, coercion, and other negative characteristics on the part of courthouse regulars, and to injustice for those criminal defendants who do not wish to plead guilty. He suggests that criminal courts have become overly dependent on plea bargaining, which is used much more extensively than is either necessary or appropriate.

In an era of rising crime and youth violence, skyrocketing homicide rates in the inner cities, strapped municipal budgets and overwhelmed courts, what could be more untimely than a call to reduce plea bargaining and devote more resources to holding jury trials? Yet the issue of bargain justice, like the proverbial bad penny, stubbornly refuses to go away. The concern persists, not only for a lonely band of academics but also for many ordinary citizens, that plea bargaining compromises our aspirations to justice at the same time that it undermines the effective punishment of serious offenders.

David Lynch nicely captures what John Langbein has denounced as the “torture” of plea bargaining. Langbein's wickedly suggestive essay traced modem criminal trial practice back to medieval criminal systems in which the body of the defendant became the victim in a social sacrifice. The modern analog, for Langbein, is that the Warren Court due process revolution “guaranteed” defendants a wide variety of procedural rights that society simply cannot afford (or, Lynch would say, refuses to afford) them. The result is the outrageously generous offer the state makes to the defendants. Put somewhat differently, this sort of “incentive system” plays mind games with the much-touted principle of autonomy built into the due process/waiver model. If trials establish an automatic “risk-preferring” principle on defendants, plea bargaining tempts them with a risk-averse alternative they might well wish they had never been offered. It is both more choice and less freedom. Plea bargaining forces a “normatively thinking” defendant into the world described by Judge Easterbrook in a parallel wickedly suggestive essay, in which he portrays bargaining as the cost system for rendering into usable averages all the predictive doubts we may have about the defendant's chances of winning on both substantive and procedural grounds.