We argue that given finite resources to review the large number of lower court decisions, Supreme Court justices should primarily be interested in aggregate responses to their precedents. We offer a theory in which the US Supreme Court drives aggregate responses to its decisions by signaling the utility of its precedents to judges on the lower courts. Specifically, we argue that lower court judges have a greater propensity to rely on a Supreme Court decision when the justices explicitly direct a lower court to consider a formally argued decision in its summary decisions. Our results demonstrate that such signals significantly increase the frequency with which the lower courts adopt the precedents of the US Supreme Court. We corroborate the causality of these links through qualitative analyses, distance matching methods, and simultaneous sensitivity analysis. Our study offers new and important insights on judicial impact and decision-making behavior in the American courts.

At least four observationally equivalent theories argue that federal judges follow public opinion when they decide cases. Yet there is mixed empirical support for these theories. Using recently released data on public opinion, we discover that state public opinion exerts a meaningful impact on the votes of federal circuit court judges. Perhaps more important, we leverage a number of different empirical approaches to identify which theory the data support. The data suggest that circuit court judges may change along with society but also that they follow public opinion because they care about their reputations in their home states.

Sectors of the criminal justice system have bureaucratized to such an extent that their management has supplanted the values for which they were created. Weber predicted this phenomenon, arguing that substantive rationality would be replaced by formal rationality as organizations grew. We test the relationship between size and these two types of rationality with the use of judicial performance checks in arraignments created from conversations with administrative courthouse staff and pilot observations at courthouses. We measure judicial performance through arraignment checklists (n = 481). Findings from multilevel models suggest that there is a positive relationship between size and formal rationality and a negative relationship between size and substantive rationality, even when controlling for workload by research design. Results suggest that abundance of formal rationality or substantive rationality facilitates injustice. These results begin a discourse encouraging quantitatively measuring formal and substantive rationality and that size be considered regarding judicial administrative policy.

Judicial politics scholars routinely posit that the behavior of Supreme Court justices is motivated in important part by concerns of institutional maintenance, that is, by a desire to maintain the Court’s unusually large store of institutional legitimacy. Previous work on this topic, however, has focused almost exclusively on the influence of such motivation on judicial decision making. We contend that if institutional maintenance is an important goal, it should be observable in other contexts as well. We examine televised mass-media interviews with Supreme Court justices from 1998 to 2016 and find that legitimacy reinforcement is the predominant goal reflected in justices’ rhetoric in those interviews.

Political scientists interested in the structure of legal doctrine are especially attuned to the impact of the judicial hierarchy. They generally frame the issue as whether a higher court will issue a rigid “rule” to prevent shirking or a vague “standard” to give more discretion to lower courts. This “rules versus standards” debate rests on two presumptions: jurists write doctrine, and doctrine varies in flexibility. Using the US Supreme Court, I offer an initial empirical evaluation of these presumptions. The findings reveal that the justices almost always adopt doctrine suggested to them and that these doctrines differ little in flexibility.

Some studies examining the effect of court decisions on public opinion examine their legitimacy-conferring role or ability to cause the public to accept specific policies. Others examine when courts act as a “republican schoolmaster” and change substantive policy attitudes. Using two studies, this article shows that these two effects are driven by different processes and caused by a different form of support. Legitimacy perceptions or diffuse support drives the process that causes people to accept specific policies. The process that changes a person’s substantive policy stance is driven by a person’s evaluation of the court’s previous policy decisions or specific support.