The United States has been involved in the question of Jerusalem ever since the American government assumed a major role in promoting adoption of the Palestine Partition Resolution at the United Nations in 1947. The continuing centrality of the Jerusalem issue in the Arab-Israeli dispute is attested to by the references to Jerusalem in the 1982 Reagan Plan for Peace in the Middle East. Even more significant is the fact that although the Jerusalem issue did not figure in the text of the 1978 Camp David Agreements, it was the subject of three separate letters appended to the Agreements by Prime Minister Begin, President Sadat and President Carter. In fact, it is no secret that the Camp David Talks nearly foundered at the last minute over the Jerusalem question. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the United States, which signed the Agreements simply as a witness and not as a party, found it necessary and proper to publicly define its position on the issue of Jerusalem. On no other issue did the American government feel compelled to put forth an official independent viewpoint in the final documents.

Personal characteristics may be relevant to criminal liability in one of two cases. Firstly, in offences which can only be committed by an actor with a special status (offences of delicta propria): for example, bigamy, committed by a “married person”; perjury which only a “witness” can commit; corruption by a “public servant”. Secondly, where the personal characteristic either aggravates or mitigates the basic offence. Thus, in Israeli law, parricide —killing one's parents—defined in sec. 300(a)(1) of the Penal Law, 1977, is an aggravated form of manslaughter; while infanticide—where a mother kills her newborn baby is, according to sec. 303(a) of the Law, a mitigated form of either murder or manslaughter. Similarily, stealing by an employee, according to sec. 391 of the Penal Law, is an aggravated form of theft; and stealing by public servant, according to sec. 390, is an even more aggravated form of stealing by employee.

In this paper I shall limit myself to the second set of characteristics. My aim is to examine the solution required under the law of complicity in instances where the personal characteristic, which either aggravates or mitigates the offence, obtains only in one of the participants. Will the secondary party, who either instigated or aided a son to kill his father, be held liable as an accomplice to the aggravated offence of parricide committed by the son? Will a similar conclusion be applied where the accomplice instigated infanticide? What about an employee who aided another to steal from his employer? And to what offence will the principal offender in that case be held liable?