The Pure Theory of Law is a theory of positive law, not of a definite legal order, but of the law in general. It is a general theory of law. As such it is the most consistent version of that school of jurisprudence which is called legal positivism because it considers as “law” only positive law and refuses to recognize as law any other normative social order even if, in the usage of language, it is called “law”, as e.g. so-called “natural law”.

Law is—according to the Pure Theory of Law—by its very nature a definite type of norm. As a “norm” the law is the specific meaning of an act of will directed at a definite human behavior. This meaning is: that men ought to behave in a certain way. Hence an essential presupposition of the Pure Theory of Law as a positivistic theory is the recognition of the fundamental difference between the “ought” and the “is”, between norms and assertions. Assertions describe a certain object; they are true or false; norms are not describing, but prescribing; they are neither true nor false; they are valid or non-valid. Hence it is necessary to distinguish as clearly as possible between legal norms established by the legal authority, and assertions of the science of law about legal norms, the sentences by which this science describes its object.

It is an accepted principle that a master is vicariously liable for the torts of his servant committed in the course of his employment. While the principle itself is clear, in its practical application many serious problems arise. These problems turn mainly on the question, whether the master is liable when the servant acts solely for his own ends and not on behalf of the master. This question has been considered in numerous cases and there are two apparently opposing trends of judicial authority.

On the one hand there is a long line of decisions, beginning in the 17th century and continuing up to the present time, which lays down that the master is not liable if the servant acts solely to further his own private interests.

It has been asserted by Gunnar Myrdal, the renowned Swedish economist, that one of the three major obstacles to the satisfactory progress of international economic cooperation and integration is that the methods of settling international disputes are ineffective and primitive.

That the lack of adequate institutional facilities for the settlement of investment disputes has in particular hampered the flow of capital from the affluent to the developing nations (at a time when the revolution of rising expectations so extensively depends upon it) cannot be seriously doubted. As pointed out by one writer: “It does not appear realistic to expect a foreign investor to allow adjudication of his grievance before a tribunal of the nation in which the grievance arises, or before a tribunal of a nation allegedly causing the grievance… For similar reasons, a nation which is a party to a grievance will not normally allow its rights to be adjudicated by a tribunal of a nation of which a complaining foreign investor is a national.”

The purpose of this article is to discuss the problem of drawing a line between law and politics, as it presented itself to courts in Israel. Any such discussion must take as its starting point the judgment of the late President of the Supreme Court of Israel, Dr. M. Smoira, in Jabotinsky v. Weizmann So far as I know, it was here that the term “justiciable” was first used in this context in Israel. This was a case concerning the formation of a new government. The former government, headed by Mr. Ben-Gurion, had received a vote of non-confidence and resigned. The President of the State, after consulting the parties, asked Mr. Ben-Gurion to form a new government and, upon his refusal, had let the matter rest. The petitioner's complaint was that the President should have called upon each and every one of all the 120 members of the Knesset until one was found who succeeded in forming a new government. He applied to the Supreme Court, sitting in its original jurisdiction as a High Court of Justice, for a writ of mandamus against the President ordering him to do so. Two points were submitted by the Attorney General in opposing the grant of an order nisi. His first submission was that the Court should assume no jurisdiction over the President of the State. In this submission he failed, but he succeeded on his second ground, which concerns us here, namely that the matter, being “political”, was not justiciable.

The difference between what a man already owns, or property, and what he is only entitled to claim, or obligation, is fundamental. A debt represents what a man is entitled to claim, but because of its proximity to a claim in detinue and for other reasons to be hereafter discussed, it is for many purposes treated as if it were something that a man already owns. The owner of a debt may not help himself by seizing what he is owed and must, like the owner of any chose in action, implement his right with the cooperation of the debtor or else by resort to the courts. Nevertheless, he who owns a debt enjoys a peculiarly “strong” right. This strength derives in part from the “real” nature of the right; by virtue of this a creditor, such as a lender or an unpaid vendor, is treated in some respects almost as if he were already the owner of what is owed, in particular a lender as if he went on owning the money lent to the borrower. And even in cases where a debt does not originate in a real transaction (as, for instance, a judgment-debt or income tax owed to the government, in which cases the creditor has not previously given that, or the equivalent of that, which he now claims) it is still “strong” because the object in obligatione, viz. money or other fungibles, is “indestructible” and therefore a debt cannot be frustrated by impossibility.

A visit to one of Israel's collective settlements, the Kibbutzim, has in the last decades become an essential part of the normal itinerary of the foreign tourist. So great is the pride which Israelis take in this form of settlement (of which there were 230 in 1965) that a visit to one is assured by the tourist's unwillingness to offend his hosts, if not by his interest in the Kibbutz.

It is therefore interesting to note that the Israel Legislature, unlike the tourist, has for a considerable time not been moved to pay special attention to this unique form of social organization, and only of late have any steps been taken to develop a special body of law specifically relating to the Kibbutz.