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A Real Peace Tradition? Norway and the Manchurian Crisis, 1931–1934

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 December 2009

ELDRID I. MAGELI*
Affiliation:
Department of Archaeology, Conservation and History (IAKH), University of Oslo, P.O. Box 1008 Blindern, 0315 Oslo, Norway; e.i.mageli@iakh.uio.no.

Abstract

This article questions Norway's role as peace promoter during the Manchurian crisis in the early 1930s. It appears that Norway's attitude towards Japan was more ambiguous and less consonant with the anti-war, anti-Japanese stand hitherto assumed on the basis of Norway's performance in the League of Nations. Norway's foreign ministry was mainly interested in Norway's practical and security needs, and fairly indifferent to events unfolding in the Far East, unless these affected Norwegian economic and political interests. For Norwegian diplomats and senior officials Japan was a civilised state and an important commercial partner. Favourable disposition towards Japan led the foreign ministry in 1934 to appear to acknowledge the ascendance of Emperor Pu Yi in the puppet state Manchukuo. This created considerable embarrassment in diplomatic and political circles.

Une véritable tradition pour la paix? la norvège et la crise de la mandchourie, 1931–1934

Cet article se penche sur le rôle de la Norvège en tant que promoteur de la paix durant la crise de la Mandchourie du début des années 1930. Il semble que l'attitude de la Norvège face au Japon était plus ambiguë et moins en rapport avec la position pacifiste et anti-japonaise qu'elle avait jusque-là défendue au sein de la Société des Nations. Le Ministère des affaires étrangères norvégien était surtout intéressé aux besoins pratiques et sécuritaires de la Norvège, et était plutôt indifférent à ce qui se passait en Extrême-Orient, pour autant que cela ne touchât pas aux intérêts économiques et politiques de la Norvège. Pour les diplomates et fonctionnaires supérieurs norvégiens, le Japon était un Etat civilisé et un partenaire commercial important. Sa disposition favorable à l'égard du Japon a mené à la reconnaissance de l'Empereur Puyi dans l'Etat fantoche du Mandchoukouo par le Ministère des affaires étrangères en 1934, ce qui embarrassa considérablement les cercles diplomatiques et politiques.

Eine wahrhaftige friedenstradition? norwegen und die mandschurei-krise, 1931–1934

Dieser Artikel hinterfragt Norwegens Rolle als Friedensförderer während der Mandschurien-Krise zu Beginn der 1930er Jahre. Norwegens Verhalten gegenüber Japan war eher zwiespältig und stimmte nicht mit der pazifistischen und anti-japanischen Haltung überein, welche Norwegens Politik bis dahin im Völkerbund charakterisierte. Das norwegische Außenministerium war vor allem an Norwegens Sicherheit und praktischen Bedürfnissen interessiert und begegnete den Geschehnissen im Fernen Osten mit Gleichgültigkeit, solange diese nicht Norwegens wirtschaftliche und politische Bedürfnisse berührten. Für Norwegens Diplomaten und höhere Beamten war Japan ein zivilisierter Staat und ein wichtiger Handelspartner. Die vorteilshafte Einstellung gegenüber Japan brachte das Außenministerium 1934 zum Anschein den Aufstieg des Kaisers Pu Yi im Marionettenregime Mandschukuo anzuerkennen. Dies führte zu tiefer Verlegenheit in diplomatischen und politischen Kreisen.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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References

1 Nobel laureates in 1921 and 1922. Lange was awarded the prize for his work for the Inter-Parliamentary Union, Nansen for his humanitarian and peace-promoting work.

2 This research project is led by Professor Helge Pharo at the University of Oslo. For a broader presentation of the project, see Pharo, Helge, ‘Den norske fredstradisjonen – et forskningsprosjekt’, Historisk Tidsskrift 84, 2 (2005), 239–55Google Scholar.

3 Riste, Olav, Norway's Foreign Relations – A History (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget 2005), 134Google Scholar; Fure, Oddbjørn, Mellomkrigstid 1920–1940 (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1996), 192–4Google Scholar.

4 When hostilities broke out in China, Norway represented the Scandinavian countries in the League Council. The League of Nations had three principal organs: the Secretariat, the Council and the Assembly. The great powers (initially Britain, France, Italy and Japan) were permanent members of the Council, while smaller states, at least four, were elected on a rotation basis by the League Assembly. All member states were represented in the Assembly. Authorisation for sanctions required majority votes in the Council and the Assembly, the parties to the dispute being excluded.

5 The name is sometimes spelt P'u-i or Puyi. He was also called Henry Pu Yi.

6 Winter, Jay, Dreams of Peace and Freedom: Utopian Moments in the 20th Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006)Google Scholar, passim.

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11 Riste, ‘Ideal og eigeninteresser’, 53–88.

12 Nils Yngvar Bøe Lindgren, ‘Norge og opprettelsen av Folkeforbundet’, master's thesis, University of Oslo, 1993, 188–90.

13 Jones, Scandinavian States, 71–6; Fure, Mellomkrigstid, 184.

14 Jones, Scandinavian States, 29, Fure, Mellomkrigstid, 181; Lindgren, ‘Norge’, 127–33.

15 Ørvik, Sikkerhetspolitikken, 39–43; Riste, Norway's Foreign Relations, 113.

16 Ørvik, Sikkerhetspolitikken, 22, 45; Karl Erik Haug, ‘Stormaktsgarantier og kollektiv sikkerhetsgaranti 1918–1940’, in Roald Berg, ed., Selvstendig og beskyttet: Det stormaktsgaranterte Norge fra Krimkrigen til NATO (Bergen: Fagbokforlaget 2008), 49–60.

17 For an elaboration of the concept of ‘small-state philosophy’, see Steine, ‘Forskning og formidling’, 263; Riste, Norway's Foreign Relations, 130.

18 Ørvik, Sikkerhetspolitkken, 144; Riste, Norway's Foreign Relations, 131.

19 Riste, Norway's Foreign Relations, 133.

20 Ørvik, Sikkerhetspolitikken, 49–53; Jones, Scandinavian States, 13.

21 Ørvik, Sikkerhetspolitikken, 152–3.

22 Ibid., 159–66.

23 Haug, Stormaktsgarantier, 52.

24 Ørvik, Sikkerhetspolitikken, 63, 152–4. The relevant literature does not discuss whether leading actors at the time saw arms race as a major cause of war.

25 This issue is discussed in Karl-Erik Haug's forthcoming Ph.D. thesis, ‘Folkeforbundet og krigens bekjempelse. Norsk utenrikspolitikk mellom realisme og idealisme’.

26 Norway's delegation was eight in number; three were formal delegates. Sweden sent nineteen (nine delegates), Denmark twenty-one (eight delegates). Haug, ‘Folkeforbundet og krigens bekjempelse’.

27 Ibid. It should be noted that in a recent paper Marta Magdalena Stachurska suggests that it was the deterioration of the international situation that made it difficult for the Norwegian delegation to pursue the issue: see Stachurska, ‘Against Failed Hopes – Norway in the League of Nations from the Disarmament Conference to the Appeasement Policy’, forthcoming article in anthology by Forum for Contemporary History, University of Oslo.

28 France, Japan, United Kingdom and United States.

29 The signatories were Belgium, China, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom and United States.

30 Zara Steiner, The Lights that Failed: European International History 1919–1933 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 377.

31 Sandra Wilson, The Manchurian Crisis and Japanese Society 1931–1933 (London: Routledge, 2002), 16.

32 Most of the following is based on Christopher Thorne, The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931–1933 (London: Hamilton, 1972), 132–73.

33 Quoted in ibid., 162.

34 Quoted in ibid., 143.

35 Ibid., 164.

36 Eldrid Mageli, Towards Friendship: The Relationship between Norway and Japan, 1905–2005 (Oslo: Unipub 2006), 37–40.

37 Nish, Ian, Japan's Struggle with Internationalism: Japan, China and the League of Nations, 1931–1933 (London: Kegan Paul International, 1993), 88–9Google Scholar.

38 Steiner, Lights, 736.

39 Nish, Ian, Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period (London: Praeger, 2002), 87Google Scholar.

40 Ibid., 89.

41 Steiner, Lights, 741–2.

42 Fure, Mellomkrigstid, 191–195.

43 Jones, Scandinavian States, 256.

44 Dagbladet, 1 February 1932; Tidens Tegn, 29 February 1932; Arbeiderbladet, 23 February 1932. These and other articles are referred to in Hans Per Hem, ‘Norge, Folkeforbundet og Manchuria-konflikten’, master's thesis, University of Oslo, 1987, 66–9.

45 Fure, Mellomkrigstid, 193; Hem, Norge, 75.

46 Bergh, Trond and Lange, Even, Foredlet Virke: Historien om Borregaard 1889–1989 (Oslo: Ad Notam, 1989), 155Google Scholar.

47 Hem, Norge, 78.

48 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA), 30 April and 3 June 1932, The National Archives, Oslo (TNA), NMFA, Box 7423S-2259, H 60.

49 Lo Wen-Kan to Aall, 25 June 1932, ibid.

50 Aall to Lo Wen-Kan, 1 July 1932, ibid.

51 Aall to NMFA, 04 Oct 1931, TNA, NMFA, Box 7426S-2259, H60.

52 Aubert to the NMFA, 13 Oct. 1932, ibid.

54 See for instance an article by O. M. Green, Japan Times & Mail, 27 Sept. 1932.

55 Aubert to the NMFA, 13 Oct. 1932, TNA, NMFA, Box 7426S-2259, H 60.

56 Walters, F. P., A History of the League of Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 469–70Google Scholar.

57 Grew, Joseph C., Ten Years in Japan (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1944), 70Google Scholar.

58 Aubert to the NMFA, 13 Feb 1932. TNA, NMFA, Box 7424S-2259.

59 Aubert to the NMFA, 9 March 1932, ibid.

60 Louise Young, Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 5.

61 Ibid., 16.

62 Ibid., 22–52.

63 Aubert to the NMFA, 13 March 1933, TNA, NMFA, Box 7424S-2259.

64 Norway was a member of the Council from 1930 to 1933. See Jones, Scandinavian States, 256.

65 Aubert to the NMFA, 29 March 1933, TNA, NMFA, Box 7424S-2259.

66 The Leg. in Geneva to the NMFA, 3 June 1933, ibid.

67 Foreign Minister Hsieh Chiehshih to the NMFA, 1 March 1934, ibid.

68 NMFA to Hsieh Chiehshih, 2 March 1934, ibid. ‘Manchoutikuo’ is a non-standard spelling of Manchukuo.

69 Fure, Mellomkrigstid, 251.

70 Riste, Norway's Foreign Relations, 133.

71 Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Holy See, Liberia, Lithuania, Nepal and Turkey.

72 Birkeland to the NMFA, 8 March 1934, TNA, NMFA, Box 7424S-2259.

73 The Chinese Leg. in Oslo to the NMFA, 6 March 1934, ibid.

74 Esmarch to Birkeland, 13 March 1934, ibid.

75 Birkeland to Esmarch, 19 March 1934, ibid.

76 Reusch to the NMFA, ibid.

77 Statement from Chekiai Agency Radio Service, 23 March 1934, ibid.

78 Birkeland to Esmarch, 18 April 1934, ibid.

79 Reusch to the NMFA, 24 May 1934, ibid.

80 Colban to the NMFA, 13 Nov 1934, ibid.

81 Ibid. Colban's comments come across as particularly odd, since he is otherwise known for his efforts, by way of personal diplomacy, to protect ethnic and other minorities within the League system. See Susan Pedersen, ‘Review Essay: Back to the League of Nations’, American Historical Review, 112 (2007). 1091–117, available at www.historycooperative.org/journals/ahr/112.4/pedersen.html (last visited 16 June 2009).

82 Walters, History of the League, 468.

83 Aubert to the NMFA, 23 May 1935, TNA, NMFA, Box 7424S-2259.

84 The quote from Hunter is taken from Rana Mitter, The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and Collaboration in Modern China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 113.

85 Ibid., 114.

86 Steiner, Lights, 744.

87 Gram-Skjoldager and Tønnesson, ‘Unity and Divergence’, 302.

88 Koht made a point of distinguishing between ‘conflict’ and ‘war’.

89 Fure, Mellomkrigstid, 205–14.

90 Riste, Norway's Foreign Relations, 136.

91 Pedersen, ‘Back to the League’, 1097.

92 Others did too. As an interesting parallel see Michael Kennedy, ‘“Principle Well Seasoned with the Sauce of Realism”: Seán Lester, Joseph Walshe and the Definition of the Irish Free State's Policy towards Manchuria’, Irish Studies in International Affairs, 6 (1995), 79–94.

93 Eriksen, Knut Einar and Pharo, Helge Ø., Kald krig og internasjonalisering 1949–1996 (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997), 31Google Scholar.

94 Mageli, Towards Friendship.