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In Search of Power: The European Commission in the Kennedy Round Negotiations (1963–1967)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 January 2014

LUCIA COPPOLARO*
Affiliation:
University of Lisbon, Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa, Av. Aníbal Bettencourt, 9, 1600–189 Lisboa, Portugal; lucia.coppolaro@ics.ul.pt

Abstract

This article is about EEC trade policy-making in the GATT Kennedy Round negotiations. It questions whether the European Commission was decisive in terms of reaching an agreement in Brussels and then in Geneva, and whether the final outcome resembled the Commission's preferences. The article shows that in Brussels the Commission was able to make its preferences prevail only when these appealed to the Council of Ministers. In Geneva, member states pragmatically set limits to the actions of the Commission, guided by the principle of how they could enhance their trade interests. Eventually, they allowed the Commission to strengthen its role because this was in line with their interests.

À la recherche du pouvoir: la commission européenne lors des négociations du kennedy round (1963–1967)

Cet article porte sur l'élaboration des politiques commerciales de la CEE lors des négociations du Kennedy Round au GATT. L'auteur s'interroge sur la fermeté de la Commission lorsqu'il s'est agi de conclure un accord à Bruxelles, puis à Genève, et se demande si le résultat final correspondait aux préférences de la Commission. Il montre qu'à Bruxelles, la Commission n'a pu insister sur ses préférences que lorsque le Conseil des ministres y était favorable. À Genève, les États membres, guidés qu'ils étaient par l'objectif de l'amélioration de leurs intérêts commerciaux, ont adopté une approche pragmatique qui consistait à limiter les actions de la Commission. S'ils ont en fin de compte permis à la Commission de renforcer son rôle, c'est que cela correspondait à leurs intérêts.

Suche nach macht: die europäische kommission in den verhandlungen der kennedy-runde (1963–1967)

Dieser Beitrag befasst sich mit der Handelspolitik der EWG in den Verhandlungen der Kennedy-Runde im Rahmen des GATT. Er setzt sich mit der Frage auseinander, ob die Rolle der Europäischen Kommission für das Erzielen einer Einigung in Brüssel und dann in Genf maßgeblich war und ob das Endergebnis ihren Präferenzen entsprach. Dabei wird deutlich, dass die Kommission ihre Präferenzen in Brüssel nur durchsetzen konnte, wenn sie auch vom Ministerrat befürwortet wurden. In Genf ließen sich die Mitgliedstaaten davon leiten, wie sie ihre Handelsinteressen vorantreiben konnten und setzten dem Vorgehen der Kommission pragmatisch Grenzen. Schließlich unterstützten sie jedoch die Bestrebungen der Kommission, ihre Rolle zu stärken, weil es ihren eigenen Interessen entsprach.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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References

1 FO 172311, Telegram 129 from Cohen to Foreign Office, 27 Sept. 1963, Foreign Office Records, The National Archives (hereafter TNA) London.

2 On enlargement see Geary, Michael J., The European Commission and the First Enlargement of the European Union: Challenging for Power? (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013)Google Scholar; on the CAP see Knudsen, Ann-Christina L., Farmers on Welfare: The Making of Europe's Common Agricultural Policy, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009)Google Scholar.

3 Ludlow, N. Piers, ‘The Emergence of a Commercial Heavy-Weight: The Kennedy Round and the European Community of the 1960s’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 18, 2 (2007), 351–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 For an analysis of the EEC's participation in the Kennedy Round see Coppolaro, Lucia, The Making of a World Trading Power: The European Economic Community (EEC) in the GATT Kennedy Round Negotiations (1963–1967) (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013)Google Scholar. On the negotiations in the Kennedy Round see, among others, Zeiler, Thomas W., American Trade and Power in the 1960s (New York: Columbia UP, 1992)Google Scholar and Preeg, Ernest H., Traders and Diplomats: An Analysis of the Kennedy Round of Negotiations under the GATT (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1970)Google Scholar.

5 On US–Western Europe relations see Winand, Pascaline, Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe (New York: Macmillan, 1993)Google Scholar.

6 Zeiler, American Trade and Power, 73–102.

7 Archives of the Council of Ministers of the European Union, Brussels (hereafter CM2) 1963/946 Note S/628/62, 30 Nov. 1962.

8 HAEC-CEAB 5/1169, Lettre de Wehrer, de la Direction des Relations Extérieurs, à Van Kleffens, de la Délégation de la Haute Autorité auprès du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, 4 Mar. 1963.

9 Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, France (hereafter MAEF), DE/CE 1961–1966 GATT 949, Direction des Affaires Économiques et Financières, Note 174/CE, 17 Oct. 1962; CM2 1963 PV de la 100ème session du Conseil de la CEE, 1–2 Apr. 1963.

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20 On the grains quarrel see Knudsen, Farmers on Welfare, 207–65.

21 TNA, BT 241/840 Telegram 175 from Cohen to Foreign Office, 26 Nov. 1963.

22 For the US support to the Commission throughout the round, see Coppolaro, Lucia, ‘US policy on European integration during the GATT Kennedy Round negotiations (1962–1967): The last Hurrah of America's Europeanists’, International History Review, 33, 3 (2011), 409–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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34 AECB 122/1991 – 16, Liste des exceptions, 13 Oct. 1964.

35 This description of the approval of the exceptions list is grounded on CM2 1964/143, PV de la 149ème session du Conseil de la CEE, 10–15 Dec. 1964; AECB Marjolin's cabinet paper Box 791, Liste d'exceptions de la CEE, 4 Dec. 1964.

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40 AECB, PV 337, 17 Nov. 1965.

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47 TNA BT 241/849 Confidential note ‘Kennedy Round’, 21 Mar. 1967.

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50 CM2 1967/28 PV de la 216ème réunion du Conseil de la CEE, 10–11 May 1967.

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53 TNA PREM 13/1869 ‘Note, 16 May 1967; AECB BAC 122/1991–12 ‘Communication de la Commission au Conseil', 31 May 1967.