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Engineering the Economy through Austerity: The Influence of International Economic Expertise in Iceland after the First World War
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 April 2024
Abstract
This essay explores how Iceland, a newly independent state on the northern European periphery, responded to the international agenda for post-war stabilisation set out by economic experts after the turmoil of the First World War. It shows that the government of the so-called Austerity Alliance, led by Jón Þorláksson, adopted austerity policies devised at the international financial conferences in Brussels (1920) and Genoa (1922). To please external experts and creditors, it implemented a comprehensive fiscal and monetary policy of austerity and created a new central bank that was independent of politics. The aim, however, was not to divorce markets from government in a return to a pre-war era of laissez-faire as the scholarly literature suggests. Offering the first analysis of ‘the Icelandic business cycle’, the Þorláksson government enforced austerity by carving out ‘the economy’ – a measurable entity legible to expert management – that greatly expanded the role of the state.
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References
1 ‘Interview with Kristján Albertsson.’ Jón Þorláksson (1877–1935) [JÞ] 2017 G/1. National Archives of Iceland [NAI]. All translations from Icelandic are by the author.
2 Until the Second World War, Iceland maintained a contractual relationship with the Danish king as a separate state, with Denmark continuing to conduct its foreign relations on ‘its behalf’; the last vestiges of the constitutional ties with Denmark were severed in 1944, when Iceland became a republic.
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18 For this distinction between different conceptions of ‘the economy’, see Quinn Slobodian, ‘Which “the Economy”: Complicating the Timothy Mitchell Thesis’, comment at Historicizing ‘the Economy’ Workshop, Harvard University, Sept. 2016. For the invention of ‘the economy’, see Timothy Mitchell, ‘Fixing the Economy’, Cultural Studies 12, no. 1 (1998): 82–101; Tooze, Adam, The Making of Modern Economic Knowledge: Economic Statistics and the German State, 1900–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)Google Scholar; Slobodian, Quinn, ‘How to See the World Economy: Statistics, Maps, and Schumpeter's Camera in the First Age of Globalization’, Journal of Global History 10 (2015): 307–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Timothy Shenk, ‘Inventing the American Economy’ (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2016).
19 See Blyth, Austerity, 121.
20 Mattei also views austerity as an expert project but does not explore its connections to the ‘invention’ of ‘the economy’ or study of business cycles. Mattei, The Capital Order, 161–204.
21 Þorláksson, Lággengið, 209.
22 The author added that ‘few if any follow the advice that was given and most of it is long forgotten’. Morgunblaðið, 10 Oct. 1925. Previously, this conservative daily had published a speech by the Danish Prime Minister, Niels Neergaard, in which he stated that ‘the International Financial Meeting in Brussels arrived unanimously at the conclusion that the only remedy to the financial crisis’ included ‘austerity in public finances to achieve balance between revenues and expenditures … the government of Denmark has implemented this policy’. Morgunblaðið, 3 June 1921, 2.
23 See Lággengið, 184, 303; Alþingistíðindi, 1925 C, 636.
24 Clavin, Securing the World Economy, 19; Clara E. Mattei, ‘The Guardians of Capitalism: International Consensus and the Technocratic Implementation of Austerity’, Journal of Law and Society 1, no. 44 (2017): 16.
25 Cassel, Gustav, Theory of the Social Economy (New York: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1967), 42Google Scholar.
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27 See Mattei, The Capital Order, 164–200.
28 Blyth argues that interwar austerity was made up of liquidationist theory, i.e. US ‘banker's view’ and the Austrian school, and the UK ‘treasury view’. Blyth, Austerity, 121; Also Eichengreen, Barry, Hall of Mirrors: The Great Depression, The Great Recession, and the Uses and Misuses of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015)Google Scholar.
29 Cassel, Theory of the Social Economy, 649.
30 For Wicksell, see Álit Milliþinganefndar, 64.
31 Cassel, Gustav, Money and Foreign Exchange after 1914 (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1922)Google Scholar.
32 Ibid.
33 See, for example, Alþingistíðindi, 1899 A, 307; Alþingistíðindi, 1907, 490; ÍsafoldI, 20 Dec. 1911, 80; Réttur, 1 Feb. 1917, 110. Morgunblaðið, 12 Dec. 1919, 3.
34 Alþingistíðindi, 1905, 942.
35 For Volkswirtschaft as ‘the economy’, see Adam Tooze, ‘Unmaking the Economy’, presented at the ‘Foucault, Political Life and History’ workshop at the LSE, 17 June 2016.
36 Desrosières, Alain, The Politics of Large Numbers: A History of Statistical Reasoning (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 164Google Scholar.
37 Hagtíðindi, Hagstofa Íslands (1914–1924); Verslunarskýrslur Íslands, Hagstofa Íslands (1914–1924).
38 The creation of the first indices in Iceland has not been studied. The initial indices were based on information on the prices of over sixty consumer goods, including common foodstuffs and other necessities such as soap, oil, and coal. To begin with, the index was a simple average of commodity prices but, starting in 1924, the bureau chief implemented weighted averages, giving greater significance to some prices rather than others (and adding clothing, housing, and rent to the basket). This was not based on surveys of household expenditures (until the 1930s) as much as the bureau chief's estimate of his own household. Þorsteinsson, Þorsteinn, ‘Verðbreytingar síðustu ára’, Tímarit lögfræðinga og hagfræðinga 1, no. 2 (1922–1923): 64–96Google Scholar. See earlier 1912 attempt: Landshagsskýrslur 1912 (Reykjavik: Ísafoldarprentsmiðja, 1913), 411.
39 Jamie Martin, ‘Time and the Economics of the Business Cycle under Modern Capitalism’, in Power and Time: Temporalities in Conflict and the Making of History, eds. Dan Edelstein et al. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2020), 317–34.
40 Þorláksson, Lággengið, 267. See also Guðmundur Jónsson, ‘Baráttan um Landsverzlun’, in Landshagir. Þættir úr íslenzkri atvinnusögu, ed. Heimir Þorleifsson (Reykjavík: Landsbanki Íslands, 1986), 115–38.
41 Scholars have subsequently debated the economic impact of the war with more sophisticated GDP estimates supporting Þorláksson's analysis. See Guðmundur Jónsson, Hagvöxtur og iðnvæðing. Þróun landsframleiðslu á Íslandi 1870–1945 (Reykjavík: Þjóðhagsstofnun, 1999).
42 Þorláksson, Lággengið, chps 6 and 7. Statistics are not available for the period, but unemployment has been estimated at around 13% at the start of 1924. Magnússon, Iceland in Transition, 154.
43 Alþingistíðindi, 1924 B, 96.
44 Jón Þorláksson, ‘Fjárstjórn á Íslandi, 1874–1922’, Morgunblaðið, 14 Feb. 1924, 2.
45 Konungritari til Jóns Þorlákssonar, 11 Mar. 1924. BA/1, LJÞ, NAI.
46 Indeed, the pre-war budget had never been large enough to warrant large-scale cutting. Þorláksson invoked the imperial practices of contemporary finance to buttress support. Without austerity, the government would soon be unable to make payments on its loans. And ‘it has happened to larger and wealthier states than ours, that their treasuries had to default and the consequences have always been the same: they have lost control of their finances and foreign debt collectors have taken them into their hands’. Þorláksson, ‘Fjárstjórn á Íslandi, 1874–1922’, Morgunblaðið, 16 Feb. 1924, 2. See also Alþingistíðindi, 1930 B, 1840–1842. Guðmundur Jónsson, ‘The State and the Icelandic Economy, 1870–1930’ (PhD diss., London School of Economic and Political Science, 1992); Blöndal, ‘Þróun viðhorfa í íslenzkri fjármálastjórn’, 101–10.
47 Jónsson, Stjórnarráð Íslands.
48 J. Saxon Mills, ed., The Genoa Conference (London: E.P. Dutton, 1922), 362.
49 Haukur Pétur Benediktsson, ‘Sparnaðarþingið 1924’, Saga 1, no. 1988 (1985): 135–67.
50 It was the main slaughterhouse industry. Alþingistíðindi, 1924 B, 96–97.
51 He also seems to have coined the Icelandic term for deflation (verðhjöðnun). Þorláksson, Lággengið, 196.
52 Landsbanki Íslands árið 1924 (1925), 3–4.
53 Landsbanki Íslands árið 1927 (1928), 5–8.
54 What resulted was a ‘wave’ of bankruptcies in smaller towns and settlements. Helgi Skúli Kjartansson, ‘Haglægðin langa á 20. öld’, in Afmæliskveðja til Háskóla Íslands, eds. Sigríður Stefánsdóttir et al. (Reykjavík: Háskólaútgáfan, 2002), 175–86.
55 This was in the same year that the United Kingdom returned to pre-war parity and just before Denmark and Norway did so. The Icelandic króna would have been raised to full pre-war parity if Þorláksson's conservative colleagues representing the export-oriented fishing sector had not forced him to fix the rate at 86 per cent to prevent bankruptcies. However, given that Iceland's post-war inflation was greater than the Scandinavian countries, the value of the króna was raised by the same amount. Jóhannes Nordal og Ólafur Tómasson, ‘Frá floti til flots. Þættir úr sögu gengismála 1922–1973’, in Klemensar bók. Afmælisrit Klemensar Tryggvasonar gefið út í tilefni af sjötugsafmæli hans 10 sept. 1984, ed. Sigurður Snævarr (Reykjavík: FVH, 1985), 217.
56 Lárusson, Ólafur, Vaka 3 (1927), 283Google Scholar.
57 Alþingistíðindi, 1924 B, 94–103.
58 Alþingistíðindi, 1926 B, 48; 1927 C, 668, 1224. Þorláksson responded by saying Cassel showed him the ‘nature and causes of the crisis and the methods for restoring the pre-war gold parity’. Alþingistíðindi, 1926 C, 1292.
59 Alþingistíðindi, 1926 C, 1359.
60 On crowding-out, see Blyth, Austerity, 123–4.
61 Jónsson, Hagvöxtur og iðnvæðing, 372.
62 Alþingistíðindi, 1924 A, 240.
63 Alþingistíðindi, 1926 B, 295–7, 382. For an interpretation of Þorláksson as anticipating Keynesian fiscal arguments, see Blöndal, ‘Þróun viðhorfa í íslenzkri fjármálastjórn’.
64 Alþingistíðindi, 1925 B, 42, 45.
65 Alþingistíðindi, 1927 B, 1477, 508.
66 Jóhannes Nordal, ‘Mótun peningakerfis fyrir og eftir 1930’, in Frá kreppu til viðreisnar. Þættir um hagstjórn á Íslandi á árunum 1930 til 1990, ed. Jónas H. Haralz (Reykjavík: Hið íslenska bókmenntafélag, 2002), 41–80.
67 Alþingistíðindi, 1927 A, 12.
68 Álit milliþinganefndar, 16–17.
69 Alþingistíðindi, 1925 C, 1231–32.
70 Álit milliþinganefndar, 5.
71 Axel Nielsen, Bankpolitik. Forste Del (Copenhagen: H. Hagerup, 1923).
72 Gjermund F. Rongved, ‘Finding Common Ground: Rebuilding the Scandinavian Monetary Union in the Interwar Years’, Scandinavian Economic History Review (2023), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/03585522.2023.2276932.
73 See a series of letters exchanged between Jón Þorláksson and Jón Krabbe in 1924, BA/1, LJÞ, NAI.
74 Álit milliþinganefndar.
75 Eichengreen and Kakridis, ‘Interwar Central Banks’, 3–39; Martin, The Meddlers. See also, Mattei, The Capital Order.
76 Eichengreen and Kakridis, ‘Interwar Central Banks’, 3–39.
77 Mills, The Genoa Conference, 361.
78 Álit milliþinganefndar, 30.
79 Nordal, ‘Mótun peningakerfis fyrir og eftir 1930’, 41–80.
80 Alþingistíðindi, 1925 C, 663.
81 Álit milliþinganefndar, 30–31.
82 Alþingistíðindi, 1927 B, 1467.
83 See Alþingistíðindi, 1926, C, 630, 645, 658; B 1927, 1531.
84 Alþingistíðindi, 1925 C 667.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid., 615.
87 Ibid., 621, 646.
88 Ibid., 631.
89 Ibid., 635.
90 Álit milliþinganefndar, 5.
91 Alþingistíðindi, 1927 B, 1476; 1925 B, 667.
92 Alþingistíðindi, 1926 C, 600.
93 Álit milliþinganefndar, 17.
94 James, Harold, ‘Ideology of Central Banking in the Interwar Years’, in The Spread of the Modern Central Bank and Global Cooperation, eds. Barry Eichengreen and Andreas Kakridis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023), 40–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
95 Andreas Kakridis, ‘“Nobody's Child”: The Bank of Greece in the Interwar Years’, in ibid. 230.
96 Alþingistíðindi, 1926 C 1166.
97 See, for example, Álit milliþinganefndar, 28–9.
98 The central bank functions were relegated to ‘a cupboard in a commercial bank’. As a result, the creation of the central bank in 1927 has hardly received any scholarly attention, and the origins of the central bank traced to its separation from the Landsbanki in 1961. Nordal, ‘Mótun peningakerfis fyrir og eftir 1930’, 41–6; Kjartansson, Helgi Skúli, ‘Stjórnvald í mótun: Drög að forsögu Seðlabankans’, Stjórnmál og stjórnsýsla 7, no. 1 (2011): 41–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
99 Eichengreen and Kakridis, ‘Interwar Central Banks’, 3–39; John Singleton, ‘Central Banks in the British Dominions in the Interwar Period’, in Eichengreen and Kakridis (eds.), The Spread of the Modern Central, 352–82.
100 Forrest Capie, Charles Goodhart and Norbert Schnadt, ‘The Development of Central Banking’, in The Future of Central Banking: The Tercentenary Symposium of the Bank of England, eds. Forrest Capie et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 1–231; Edvinsson, Rodney, Jacobson, Tor and Waldenström, Daniel, eds., Sveriges Riksbank and the History of Central Banking (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ugolini, Stefano, The Evolution of Central Banking: Theory and History (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
101 On the history of Islandsbanki see Sumarliði Ísleifsson, ‘Íslandsbanki og erlent fjármagn á Íslandi í upphafi 20 aldar’, in Rætur Íslandsbanka. 100 ára fjármálasaga, ed. Eggert Bernharðsson (Reykjavík: Íslandsbanki, 2004), 55–93; Guðmundur Jónsson, ‘Myndun fjármálakerfis á Íslandi’, in ibid., 9–54.
102 Singleton, ‘Central Banks in the British Dominions’, 352–82.
103 Alþingistíðindi, 1926 C, 600.
104 Thus reducing the reserve base of commercial banks and forcing them into a bank's ‘discount window’. Goodhart, Charles, The Evolution of Central Banks (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988)Google Scholar.
105 Kakridis, ‘“Nobody's Child”’, 230.
106 Capie, Goodhart and Schnadt, ‘The Development of Central Banking’, 65, 112–18.
107 The practice did not take off. See Álit milliþinganefndar um bankamál 1925, 13–15.
108 Ibid., 66–9.
109 The Union met annually after 1920 with the aim to restore pre-war forms of formal collaboration but was frustrated by the onset of the Great Depression. Rongved, ‘Finding Common Ground’.
110 Álit milliþinganefndar um bankamál 1925, 51.
111 The Norwegian, Danish and Finnish governors offered similar written statements. Ibid., 53, 43, 48.
112 Alþingistíðindii, 1925 C 662, 632.
113 Álit milliþinganefndar, 21–24.
114 Alþingistíðindi, 1926 C, 600, 636.
115 Alþingistíðindi, 1925 C, 614.
116 Alþingistíðindi, 1926 C, 1222.
117 Alþingistíðindi, 1926 C, 1181.
118 Álit milliþinganefndar, 18.
119 Magnús Jónsson, ‘Lán og ólán’, in Morgunblaðið, 14 Dec. 1930, 5–7.
120 Jón Þorláksson, ‘Ríkislánið’ Morgunblaðið, 30 Nov. 1930, 5; Þorláksson, Jón, ‘Tryggingarnar fyrir ríkisláninu’, Ísafold og Vörður 52 (1930): 1–2Google Scholar; Þorláksson in Alþingistíðindi, 1930 B, 2470. See also Magnús Jónsson, ‘Andsvar til Tímans’, Morgunblaðið, 21 Nov. 1930, 2; ‘Ensku lánin’, Morgunblaðiðv 15 Feb. 1931, 6.
121 See Helgi Skúli Kjartansson, Ísland á 20. öld (Reykjavík: Sögufélag, 2004).
122 Paradoxically, Þorláksson's own right-wing party was in (coalition) government for much of the post-war period.
123 Alþingistíðindi, 1930 B, 2470.
124 Including a high interest rate and a limitation on the ability of the state to mortgage its revenues. See, for example, Þorláksson, Jón, ‘Lántakan og lánstraustið. Viðtal við Jóns Þorláksson’, Ísafold og Vörður 42 (1930), 1–3Google Scholar; ‘Lokun Íslandsbanka’, Morgunblaðið, 11 Apr. 1931, 5.
125 The League of Nations would act as a clearing house, collecting the data from individual countries, making them legible for comparison and estimation by creditors. Mills, The Genoa Conference, 365–7; Clavin, Securing the World Economy.
126 Iceland had been ‘branded’ alongside financial delinquents. See, for example, ‘Tveir Morgunblaðspostular’, Tíminn, 30 Dec. 1930, 1; Jón Þorláksson, ‘Fjármálastjórn Framsóknar’, Ísafold og Vörður 21 (1930), 2–3; ‘Lántakan og lánstraustið’; ‘Lánstraustið og stjórnin’, Ísafold og Vörður 31 (1930): 1–2; ‘Lánstraustið’, Ísafold og Vörður 21 (1930): 4; ‘Ísland brennimerkt’, Ísafold og Vörður 45 (1930), 6.
127 Alþingistíðindi, 1930 B, 2742.
128 Jón Þorláksson, ‘Fjárstjórn á Íslandi, 1874–1922’, Morgunblaðið, 14 Feb. 1924, 2.
129 Kjartansson, ‘Haglægðin langa’.
130 Jónsson, ‘Lán og ólán’, 6–7.
131 Sveinn Björnsson to Jón Þorláksson, 4 Dec. 1926, BA/1, LJÞ, NAI.
132 King Secretary Jón Sveinbjörnsson to Jón Þorláksson, 3 Feb. 1927, BA/1, LJÞ, NAI.
133 Sveinn Björnsson to Jón Þorláksson, 21 June 1927, BA/1, LJÞ, NAI.