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What’s Wrong with Restrictivism?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2024

William M. Simkulet
William M. Simkulet*
Affiliation:
Philosophy, Park University, Parkville, USA
*
Email: William.Simkulet@park.edu
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Abstract

Emily Carroll and Parker Crutchfield propose a new inconsistency argument against abortion restrictivism. In response, I raised several objections to their argument. Recently Carroll and Crutchfield have replied and seem to be under the impression that I’m a restrictivist. This is puzzling, since my criticism of their view included a very thinly veiled, but purposely more charitable, anti-restrictivist inconsistency argument. In this response, I explain how Carroll and Crutchfield mischaracterize my position and that of the restrictivist.

Keywords

abortionethicsrestrictivismorgan donationinconsistency argument
Type
Commentary
Information
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics , Volume 33 , Issue 2 , April 2024 , pp. 296 - 299
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

Notes

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21. See note 15, 14, Ord 2008, Berg 2017.

22. See note 17, Berg 2017.

23. See note 19, Simkulet 2022.

24. See note 20, Simkulet 2022.

25. See note 1, Carroll, Crutchfield 2022.

26. See note 4, Carroll, Crutchfield.

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30. See note 5, Thomson 1971.

31. See note 11, Boonin 2019.

32. See note 3, Simkulet 2022.

33. See note 4, Carroll, Crutchfield.

34. See note 9, Manninen 2019.

35. See note 10, Arey et al. 2022.